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Abstract—In recent years, the popularity of fingerprint-based biometric authentication systems has significantly increased. However,
together with many advantages, biometric systems are still vulnerable to presentation attacks (PAs). In particular, this applies for
unsupervised applications, where new attacks unknown to the system operator may occur. Therefore, presentation attack detection
(PAD) methods are used to determine whether samples stem from a live subject (bona fide) or from a presentation attack instrument
(PAI). In this context, most works are dedicated to solve PAD as a two-class classification problem, which includes training a model
on both bona fide and PA samples. In spite of the good detection rates reported, these methods still face difficulties detecting PAIs
from unknown materials. To address this issue, we propose a new PAD technique based on autoencoders (AEs) trained only on bona
fide samples (i.e. one-class). On the experimental evaluation over a database of 19,711 bona fide and 4,339 PA images, including
45 different PAI species, a detection equal error rate (D-EER) of 2.00% was achieved. Additionally, our best performing AE model is
compared to further one-class classifiers (support vector machine, Gaussian mixture model). The results show the effectiveness of the
AE model as it significantly outperforms the previously proposed methods.
Index Terms—Fingerprint Recognition, Presentation Attack Detection, One-class Classifier, Autoencoder, Anomaly Detection
1 INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, we encounter biometric recognition sys-tems in many places of our daily life. Applications
range from high security border control to user convenient
smartphone unlocking. Especially fingerprint recognition
systems are long established and widely used [1].
However, biometric systems can be affected by exter-
nal attacks as the capture device is exposed to the pub-
lic. Those presentation attacks (PAs) are defined within
ISO/IEC 30107-1 [2] as a “presentation to the biometric
data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with the
operation of the biometric system”. During execution, a pre-
sentation attack instrument (PAI), e.g. a fingerprint overlay,
can be used to either impersonate someone else (i.e., impos-
tor) or to avoid being recognised (i.e., identity concealer).
Summarising, the artefact that is used for a presentation
attack is called PAI while different material combinations or
recipies result in different PAI species. As a consequence,
biometric systems require automated presentation attack
detection (PAD) modules in order to distinguish bona fide
presentations from attack presentations [3].
Since the periodic LivDet competitions started in 2009
for fingerprint [4] and in 2013 for iris [5], PAD in general
has attracted a lot of research. In parallel to those research
efforts, more and more different materials are found or
combined to create new species [6]. On the one hand, older
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PAD methods might not detect new PAI species. On the
other hand, it becomes much more challenging to collect
diverse datasets in order to develop and evaluate (new) PAD
approaches. Being a binary classification problem (bona
fide vs. PA), common PAD approaches are trained on both
classes and hence perform only as good as the chosen
training set. In this scenario, unknown attacks [7] present
only in the test set can significantly trouble the classifier,
as it requires good generalisation properties that are hard
to achieve. In order to avoid re-training the classifier each
time a new PAI species is created, one-class classifiers can
be used [8]. These models are solely trained on bona fide
samples to detect anomalies in unseen data. They are espe-
cially designed to generalise much better than multi-class
classifiers since all PAs are unknown to them.
In this context, we propose to involve convolutional au-
toencoders for unknown fingerprint PAD. We test different
architecture designs and show how the negative effect of
outliers in the training set can be reduced in comparison
to two-class classifiers. Finally, we benchmark the autoen-
coder against additional one-class classifiers to prove the
soundness of our approach. The evaluation is carried out
on data captured in the short wave infrared domain with
over 24,000 samples, including 45 different PAI species. It
should be noted, that the discussed design decisions should
be generally applicable for other input data as well.
The remaining article is structured as follows: Section 2
summarises related work on fingerprint and one-class PAD.
Our capture device is described in Section 3 and Section 4
contains the autoencoder design and our proposed PAD
method. In Section 5 we evaluate the experiments before
Section 6 concludes our findings.
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22 RELATED WORK
This section reviews state-of-the-art approaches related to
the contribution of this work. In the context of PAD, two
different solutions exists: i) software-based, where a deeper
analysis of the existing data for authentication is carried out,
and ii) hardware-based, where new sensors are developed to
capture additional data for PAD. Due to the high number
of publications for fingerprint PAD within the last decade,
we focus on hardware-based approaches in the first sub-
section and refer the reader to [9], [10] for comprehensive
surveys. On the other hand, most classifiers are trained on
both classes, hence in the second subsection we present an
overview of one-class PAD for other modalities as well.
In order to evaluate the vulnerabilities of biometric sys-
tems to PAs, the following metrics are defined within the
ISO/IEC 30107-3 standard on biometric presentation attack
detection - part 3: testing and reporting [11]:
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER):
“proportion of attack presentations using the same PAI species
incorrectly classified as bona fide presentations”.
Bona fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER):
“proportion of bona fide presentations incorrectly classified as
attack presentations”.
2.1 Hardware-based Fingerprint PAD
Similar to other pattern recognition tasks, PAD benefits from
information captured by additional sensors. This informa-
tion is then analysed with dedicated software. To that end,
an overview of hardware-based state-of-the-art fingerprint
PAD methods is presented in Table 1.
One of the most reliable methods for fingerprint PAD is
based on optical coherence tomography (OCT) [30] sensors,
which capture a 3D model of the fingertip up to two
millimeter underneath the skin. In addition to PAD, this
scan can be used to recover worn-out fingerprints, since it
includes the inner fingerprint as well. Hence, it also reveals
overlaying PAIs as well as full fake fingers. Using OCT
scanners, Darlow et al. [15] detected double bright peaks
in gelatin overlays and analysed the autocorrelation for
gelatin full fingers. Their setup achieves a 100% detection
accuracy on a database with 568 samples. Also Liu et al. [21]
analyse the peaks of OCT scans. They discover that 1D
depth scans of bona fide samples contain exactly two peaks
while one appears prior the maximum peak. Thus, they
apply a threshold to successfully distinguish between bona
fides and PAs. Training a convolutional neural network
(CNN) on overlapping patches of a depth B-scan, Chugh et
al. [23] report a detection accuracy close to 100%. However,
the utilised capture device does not acquire the fingerprint
for biometric recognition purpose. An extensive review on
OCT for fingerprint PAD is published by Moolla et al. [31].
It should be noted that the high costs of OCT scanners are
an explicit disadvantage in contrast to other methods.
Another approach utilises different illumination sources
to collect additional PAD data. Rowe et al. [12] developed
the first multi-spectral fingerprint capture device in 2008.
Their sensor captures the fingerprint in white, blue, green,
and red illumination with a twofold goal: i) improving the
recognition process, and ii) detection of PAIs. The authors
prove the suitability of their design on a massive dataset
of nearly 45,000 samples comprising 60% PAs. In a similar
approach, Hengfoss et al. [13] analysed the reflections for all
wavelengths between 400 nm and 1650 nm on the blanching
effect (i.e., the finger is pressed against a surface such that
the blood is squeezed out). They observe that these dynamic
effects only occur for bona fide presentations and neither for
PAIs nor for cadaver fingers. Additionally, they measured
the pulse of the finger but conclude that it takes much
longer and is less suited for PAD. Further optical methods
for pulse, pressure, and skin reflections are presented by
Drahansky et al. [14]. Their experiments show that skin
reflections in the evaluated wavelengths of 470 nm, 550
nm, and 700 nm outperform the other two methods. In
another approach, Kolberg et al. [26] visualise vein patterns
by placing 940 nm LEDs above the finger. Using Gaussian
pyramids, they are able to detect fingeprint PAIs since they
usually do not include a vein pattern. However, for thin and
transparent overlay attacks the bona fide veins still remain
visible, which limits detection capabilites for overlay PAIs.
More recent publications focus on the short wave in-
frared (SWIR) spectrum between 900 nm and 1700 nm,
which is not visible for the human eye but can be captured
by adequate cameras. Gomez-Barrero et al. [16] utilise the
spectral signature between different wavelengths for finger-
print PAD. Working with a rather small database, they show
that most materials reflect the illumination in a different way
than human skin. A subsequent study [17] further improves
PAD performance on those 60 samples with the use of a
CNN. Moreover, by fine-tuning two pre-trained CNNs and
training a small residual network from scratch, Tolosana
et al. [27] showed that deep learning approaches perform
much better than spectral signatures for bigger datasets. Ad-
ditionally, the results reveal that the small residual network
trained from scratch outperforms the fine-tuned VGG19 and
MobileNet CNNs, for user-convenient scenarios requiring a
low BPCER. Another extensive benchmark [28] tests two
additional CNNs and adds an advanced pre-processing
layer to them. This layer is trained on the given dataset to
pre-process a 4-channel SWIR image for usage in 3-channel
CNNs, which significantly improves PAD performance in
contrast to the manual pre-processing used in [27].
On the other hand, the technique of laser speckle contrast
imaging (LSCI) [32] is able to visualise blood movement
underneath the skin. For this purpose, a laser illuminates
the desired area and a sequence (i.e., 1 second) of images
is captured. Since this laser slightly penetrates the skin,
subtle movements within blood tissues change the reflected
speckle pattern over time [33]. Utilising this principle for
fingerprint PAD, Keilbach et al. [18] compute the temporal
contrast in order to obtain a single LSCI image for feature
extraction. Those handcrafted features (e.g, LBP, BSIF) are
then classified by support vector machines (SVMs). This
approach was later benchmarked in [24] with eight addi-
tional classifiers on a larger dataset in order to evaluate
the best PAD performance by fusing different schemes.
However, similar to the work on vein patterns, thin and
transparent overlays are often wrongly classified as bona
fide. In the case that the material of the PAI is thin enough
for the laser to still penetrate into the skin below, bona fide
properties are captured and thus the PAI is not detected.
Finally, Mirzaalian et al. [22] applied deep learning methods
3TABLE 1
Hardware-based fingerprint PAD methods with their most relevant methodologies as performance and the number of PAI species, PA samples,
and bona fide samples.
Year Ref. Description Performance #PAI #PA #BFspecies samples samples
2008 [12] Multi-spectral wavelet transform APCER = 0.9% 49 27,486 17,454430 nm, 530 nm, 630 nm + white light BPCER = 0.5%
2011 [13] Multi-spectral APCER = 0% 4 7-15 11-28blanching effect, pulse BPCER = 0%
2013 [14] Optical methods APCER = 10% N/A N/A N/Apulse, pressure, skin reflections BPCER < 2%
2016 [15] OCT, double bright peaks + autocorrelation APCER = 0% 3 28 540BPCER = 0%
2018
[16] SWIR spectral signatures + SVM APCER = 5.7% 12 47 13BPCER = 0%
[17] SWIR + CNN APCER = 0% 12 47 13BPCER = 0%
[18] LSCI + SVM APCER = 15.5% 32 225 545BSIF, LBP, HOG, histogram BPCER = 0.2%
[19] SWIR, LSCI APCER = 0% 17 227 551+ patch-based CNN BPCER = 0%
[20] Weighted score fusion + SVM APCER = 6.6% 35 442 4,291SWIR, LSCI, Finger vein BPCER = 0.2%
2019
[21] OCT peak analysis APCER = 0% 4 24,000 12,000BPCER = 0%
[22] LSCI CNN + LSTM APCER ≤ 0.14% 6 218 3,743patch-based BPCER ≤ 0.11%
[23] OCT patch-CNN APCER = 0.27% 8 357 3,413(sensor captures no fingerprints) BPCER = 0.2%
[24] LSCI benchmark + Fusion APCER = 9.01% 35 442 4,291BSIF, LBP, HOG, histogram BPCER = 0.05%
[25] Fusion of: SWIR + CNN and APCER ≤ 3% 35 442 4,291LSCI + hand-crafted features BPCER ≤ 0.1%
2020
[26] Finger vein images APCER = 11.61% 32 224 542Gaussian pyramid + SVM BPCER = 0.68%
[27] SWIR CNN fusion APCER ≈ 7% 35 442 4,291(pre-trained and from scratch) BPCER = 0.1%
[28] SWIR CNN Fusion APCER = 1.16% 41 3,310 8,2144D-input pre-processing BPCER = 0.2%
[29] 1310 nm laser sequences APCER = 3.71% 45 4,339 17,730LSTM + CNN benchmark BPCER = 0.2%
on these laser sequences. Next to more traditional CNNs,
the authors propose the usage of long short-term memory
(LSTM) networks, which are able to remember a temporal
state and can directly process the temporal information
within sequences. The results show a slight advantage of
the LSTM towards the four CNNs tested. A more extensive
benchmark on LSTMs and CNNs in [29] comes to the
conclusion that both temporal analysis of the LSTMs and
spatial analysis of some CNNs are partly complementary
and detect different PA samples.
Given the promising concepts of SWIR and LSCI data
for fingerprint PAD, fusions of both approaches have been
published in [19], [20], [25]. These multimodal approaches
prove that PAD benefits from additional sensors. The weak-
nesses of one technology can be covered by another and the
combination of different methods significantly improves the
overall detection accuracy. Additionally, fused systems are
more robust against unseen PAI species in the test set.
2.2 One-class Presentation Attack Detection
Unlike traditional classification problems, the motivation
behind one-class classifiers is learning the structure of data
samples belonging to a single class. Therefore, in case of
PAD, one-class classifiers are trained only on bona fide
samples. New and unseen samples are classified as PAs if
their structure differs from those bona fide samples used in
4TABLE 2
One-class PAD methods across different modalities.
Year Ref Modality Description
2016 [34] Fingerprint multiple OC-SVMs+ PA refining
2018 [35] Face OC-SVM + OC-GMMvs. two-class versions
2019 [36] Face Autoencoder +multi-layer perceptron
2019 [37] Fingerprint Three GANs based onDCGAN architecture [38]
the training phase. In this context, the main challenge is to
find an optimal threshold to ensure that sophisticated PAs
can still be distinguished from those bona fides that deviate
from normality. Due to the environmental conditions and
interaction factors (data subject with respect to the capture
device) a significant intra-class variation for the bona fide
class must be expected. Since the majority of published
PAD approaches are based on two-class classification, this
section reviews one-class publications across modalities as
summarised in Table 2. Due to the different modalities and
datasets used, a comparison of performance metrics is not
included.
Generally, one-class classifiers can be split into genera-
tive and non-generative approaches [35]. Generative meth-
ods aim to approximate the distribution function of the bona
fides (e.g. a Gaussian model). Non-generative approaches
focus on learning an optimal hypersphere that defines a
decision boundary to separate bona fides from PAs.
One non-generative fingerprint PAD approach has been
presented by Ding and Ross [34], who introduced an ensem-
ble of multiple one-class support vector machine (OC-SVM)
classifiers, each of which is trained on different feature sets.
The main goal of all OC-SVMs is to find the smallest pos-
sible hypersphere around the majority of training samples.
Once the boundaries of the hyperspheres are found, they
are refined using a small number of PA samples. Finally,
in order to obtain a single prediction, the scores of all OC-
SVMs are fused by majority voting. With regard to unknown
attacks not seen in the training phase, the authors reported
an averaged APCER of 15.3% vs. an averaged BPCER of
10.8% on the LivDet 2011 database [39].
Another non-generative approach for face PAD has been
proposed by Nikisins et al. [36], who use a combination of
pre-trained autoencoders (AEs) and a simple multi-layer
perceptron (MLP) for the final classification. The AEs are
used to extract features from multi-channel input data,
which in this case is a stack of greyscale, near-infrared, and
depth facial images (BW-NIR-D). Each of the AEs are only
trained on bona fide samples, thereby learning the appear-
ance of real faces. Instead of collecting a lot of training data,
Nikisins et al. use transfer learning techniques to transmit
the knowledge of facial images from the RGB to the BW-
NIR-D domain. The CNN model was pretrained on the
CelebA [40] database containing RGB facial images, which
they fine-tuned on the Wide Multi-Channel Presentation
NIR LEDs
Light Guide
SWIR & VIS 
LEDs
VIS / NIR 
Camera
SWIR / LSCI 
Camera
1310 nm fiber 
illuminator
Fig. 1. The capture device is a closed box with only one free slot for the
finger. Two cameras and multiple illuminations are able to capture the
fingerprint and additional PAD data.
Attack database (WMCA) [41]. Only the subsequent MLP
is trained on both bona fide and PA samples for the final
classification of the face images. The authors report a BPCER
of 7.3% vs. an APCER of 1%.
In another work on face PAD, Nikisins et al. [35] imple-
mented and tested both one-class Gaussian mixture models
(OC-GMM) (generative) and OC-SVMs (non-generative),
benchmarking their results, with two-class approaches as
well. For their experiments, the authors employed an aggre-
gated database as a composition of three publicly available
databases: Replay-Attack [42], Replay-Mobile [43], and MSU
MFSD [44]. Their results show a significant better detection
performance for the OC-GMM approach compared to the
OC-SVM. Particularly, they emphasise the ability of the OC-
GMM to have better generalisation properties to unknown
attack types as compared to the two-class classifiers and the
OC-SVMs. Both models were trained on the image quality
metric features introduced in [44] and [45].
Lastly, Engelsma and Jain [37] present another one-class
approach using generative adversarial networks (GANs) for
fingerprint PAD. Specifically, they trained three different
GAN models using the DCGAN architecture proposed by
Radford et al. [38]. As part of their work, they collected a
dataset comprising 12 different PAIs and 11,800 bona fide
samples. The experimental evaluation reports an APCER of
15.6% for a BPCER of 0.2%.
3 CAPTURE DEVICE
The camera-based fingerprint capture device [46] that was
used for data collection is depicted in Fig. 1. One camera
(Basler acA1300-60gm) takes finger photos in the visible
spectrum to extract the fingerprint for legacy compatibility.
This camera is also able to capture finger vein images,
when only the near-infrared (NIR) LEDs above the finger
are switched on. A second camera (100 fps Xenics Bobcat
320) captures PAD data in wavelengths between 900 nm
and 1700 nm. Both cameras are placed in a closed box next
to multiple illumination sources with only one finger slot at
the top. Once a finger is placed on this slot, all ambient light
is blocked and only the desired wavelengths illuminate the
finger. The invisible SWIR wavelengths of 1200 nm, 1300
nm, 1450 nm, and 1550 nm are especially suited for PAD
51310 nm laser
1200 nm SWIR
1300 nm SWIR
1450 nm SWIR
1550 nm SWIR
Fig. 2. Bona fide samples acquired at five different wavelengths.
because all skin types in the Fritzpatrick scale [47] reflect in
the same way as shown by Steiner et al. [48] for face PAD.
Hence, SWIR images are captured in each of these wave-
lengths. Additionally, a 1310 nm laser diode illuminates the
finger area and a sequence of 100 frames is collected within
one second. Stemming from biomedical applications, this
laser sequence is used to image and monitor microvascular
blood flow [32]. Since the laser scatters differently when
penetrating human skin in contrast to artificial PAIs, this
technique qualifies for PAD as well.
Example frames of a bona fide presentation acquired
at the aforementioned wavelengths are shown in Fig. 2.
For the laser sequence data, only one frame is depicted
since the subtle temporal changes are not visible in steady
pictures. Nevertheless, we can recognise a circle where the
laser focuses the finger. On the other hand, the LEDs achieve
a much more consistent illumination for the SWIR images,
where the skin reflections get darker for increasing wave-
lengths. The region of interest for all samples comprises
100× 300 pixels due to the fixed size of the finger slot.
4 PROPOSED PAD METHOD
This Section introduces our one-class fingerprint PAD
scheme based on a convolutional autoencoder, which is de-
scribed in Section 4.1. Since AEs measure the reconstruction
error, this concept is subsequently discussed in detail in
Section 4.2. Finally, this scheme is combined with fingerprint
PAD in Section 4.3.
4.1 Convolutional Autoencoder
A convolutional autoencoder is a neural network optimised
to copy its input data. The model consists of two com-
ponents: the encoder function h = f(x) and the decoder
function x′ = g(h), both of which are implemented as a
multi-layer CNN. This means that the AE maps an input
image x to an output image x′. The output h of the encoder
function f is a lower dimensional latent representation of
the original image x. Out of this latent variable, the decoder
function g tries to reconstruct the original image x′. In
order to force the model to learn correct parameters for
decoding the latent representation, a loss function needs to
be minimised:
L (x, g (f (x))) (1)
This loss function penalises g(f(x)) if it is dissimilar to
x. The choice of the loss function thus plays a decisive
role in the performance of convolutional AEs. In order to
increase the efficiency of the learning process, the loss value
can be calculated on a randomly selected subset called
Batch. However, one important requirement is to design
the architecture of an AE in an undercomplete way. In
other words, the dimension of h needs to be smaller than
the original dimension of input x. This forces the AE to
only extract the most relevant features from the training
data. Furthermore, it prevents the model to be in danger
of learning the identity function id(x) = x [49]. Once the
model is trained, it is able to encode and reconstruct images
x′, which resemble the training data. In case of an input
image that is dissimilar to the ones involved in training, the
reconstruction fails and leads to a high reconstruction error
(see Eq. (1)). The high input sensitivity of an AE can be
exploited to detect images that differ from the ones being
used during training. For this reason, AEs became very
popular in the field of anomaly detection (e.g. [36], [50]).
Transferred to the domain of fingerprint PAD, the AE is only
trained on bona fide samples. Later, the model can be used
to detect unknown PAs by comparing the reconstruction
error against a threshold.
4.2 Reconstruction Error (RE)
A common approach to compute the reconstruction error is
to use the mean squared error (MSE) [51] as loss function,
which is defined as
L(x, x′) =
1
B
B∑
j=1
(xj − x′j)2 = 1
B
B∑
j=1
ej(x, x′) (2)
where B denotes the number of data samples involved
in one batch iteration. The usage of MSE is convenient
since it is easy understandable and often pre-implemented.
However, there is also a major drawback in case of random
noise occurring in the data. Since the calculation of the MSE
involves squaring the difference between every pixel of the
input image, single outliers have a huge impact on the
reconstruction error. This inevitably leads to an increased
rate of bona fide samples erroneously classified as PAs. This
lack of robustness against outliers is a well known challenge
in the deep learning domain and is referred to as robust
estimation [52]. The idea of increasing the robustness of an
AE model for anomaly detection was studied by Ishii and
Takanashi [50], who introduced a weighted version of the
MSE (wMSE):
L(x, x′) =
1
B
B∑
j=1
wj ·msej(x, x′) (3)
6C US + C
ScoreConv-AE (RE)
C MP US + C ScorePooling-AE (RE)
C MP F R US + C
ScoreDense-AE (RE)
(300x100xd)
(150x50xd)
(300x100xd)
(300x100xd) (300x100xd)
(150x50xd)
(300x100xd)
(300x100xd) (300x100xd)
(150x50xd)
(64,)
(7500,) (7500,)
(150x50xd)
(300x100xd)
Conv-AE
Pooling-AE
Dense-AE
(128,)
SWIR 
(1200, 1300, 1450, 1550 nm)
Laser
(First, Middle, Last)
(128,)
Fig. 3. The baseline architectures are defined as Conv-AE, Pooling-AE, and Dense-AE. The following operations are involved: C = Convolution,
US = Upsampling, MP = Max Pooling, F = Flatten, R = Reshape. d is the image dimension: d = 4 for SWIR and d = 3 for laser samples.
where
msej(x, x′) =
1
WHI
·
W∑
w=1
H∑
h=1
I∑
i=1
ejwhi(x, x
′) (4)
and wj is defined as
wj =
{
1, msej(x, x′) ≤ C
0, msej(x, x′) > C . (5)
Here W,H and I denote the width, height, and the number
of input channels of an input image x, and C refers to the
α-th quantile of mse = [mse1, . . . ,mseB ]. The approach
of Ishii and Takanashi ignores training samples during
the optimisation process as soon as their measured MSE
exceeds a defined threshold C . Translated to the problem
of fingerprint PAD, that means that a certain percentage of
bona fides is ignored during the training phase. The authors
state that their proposed loss function is useful to cope with
unknown outliers within the training set, since they will not
distort the resulting model. Unknown outliers can occur, for
example, if the data is not labelled. Therefore, it is difficult
to differentiate them from normal data samples. However,
in our case the training data contains no PAs. That means
that excluding bona fide samples from the training process
could potentially lead to a loss of information.
For that reason, the proposed loss function of Ishii and
Takanashi is adjusted within this work. The main idea is to
integrate the weight factor such that it excludes pixel values
that the AE is systematically not able to reconstruct. In other
words, this means that the AE is optimised to reconstruct the
most meaningful areas of the images while ignoring random
noise. The adjusted loss function is defined as follows:
L(x, x′) =
1
WHI
·
B∑
j=1
W∑
w=1
H∑
h=1
I∑
i=1
wjwhie
j
whi(x, x
′) (6)
with
wjwhi =
{
1, ejwhi(x, x
′) ≤ msej(x, x′) + C · stdj
0, ejwhi(x, x
′) > msej(x, x′) + C · stdj(x, x′)
(7)
and
stdj =
√√√√ 1
WHI
·
W∑
w=1
H∑
h=1
I∑
i=1
(
ejwhi(x, x
′)−msej(x, x′)
)2
(8)
Generally speaking, every pixel value is compared to a
threshold that is a linear combination of both mean and
standard deviation of the squared error. Thus, exceeding
pixels are ignored and contrary to the MSE, it is assumed
that this approach prevents random noise from increasing
the overall reconstruction error of the bona fide samples.
The remaining challenge however consists in finding the op-
timal constant value of C . By choosing a too low threshold,
the model might tend to over-generalise such that decisive
patterns that are important for distinguishing between bona
fides and PAs are not extracted anymore. On the other hand,
if C is too high, noisy data might be involved in both
training and testing, which leads to a less robust model and
consequently increases error rates. This problem is related
to the typical trade-off between bias and variance.
74.3 PAD Scheme
We study three different architectures of an AE, as illus-
trated in Fig. 3, in order to find the best suited approach for
fingerprint PAD. The four SWIR images are concatenated
to a single 4-channel image such that one AE can work on
all information simultaneously. Taking the first, middle, and
last frame of the laser sequence, a second AE is trained on
a 3-channel input image. In contrast to a LSTM [53], the AE
is not designed to learn temporal correlation, and since the
changes within this sequence are subtle, we decided to take
into account only the three furthermost frames in a similar
way as the SWIR images are used. Due to the hardware
changes of the capture device, computing the contrast of the
laser sequence data does not work anymore as opposed to
previous work [18], [24]. Hence, we discard the term LSCI
and refer to laser sequences (or laser) in this work.
We denote the three architecture types as Conv-AE,
Pooling-AE, and Dense-AE (top to bottom in Fig. 3). The
names refer to the type of layers which were successively
added to the architecture. The Conv-AE is composed of
convolutional layers with a stride value of two in order
to reduce the dimension during the encoding phase. In
the Pooling-AE, the stride value of the convolutional op-
erations was changed to one, followed by a max pooling
operation to reduce the dimension. The last modification
Dense-AE added a Fully Connected Neural Network (Fully-
Connected NN) between the encoding and decoding phase
to reduce the dimension of the original image down to a
64-dimensional vector. All baseline architectures include a
single convolutional / max pooling layer in the encoding
phase.
The distinction between the Conv- and Pooling AE is
grounded on the findings of Springenberg et al. [54], who
claim that the max pooling operation can simply be replaced
by a convolutional layer with an increased stride without
significant loss in accuracy. On the other hand, Goodfellow
et al. [55] state that the max pooling operation leads to an
invariance of translations in smaller regions. Finally, the
Dense-AE is inspired by Ke et al. [56], who emphasise the
ability of the Fully-Connected NN to combine local fea-
tures and to find interdependent patterns within the feature
maps. Across all architectures the relu activation function
is used in all layers except for the very last convolutional
layer, where the sigmoid function proved to be the better
choice. The convolutional layer includes twelve filters and
MSE (Eq. (2)) is used to measure the reconstruction error.
In a second step, we evaluate the influence of the recon-
struction error. In particular, we take the best-performing
architecture and compare the MSE approach to the wMSE
approach by analysing different constant values C for the
threshold computation. Hence, for each adaptation a new
model is trained, since the loss function changes the learned
weights during training.
Finally, we are interested in the best fusion of both
AE types, based on SWIR and laser data, since previous
approaches [19], [20], [25] show a significant improvement
in PAD performance. For this reason, we compute different
weighted fusions and compare the results in order to find
the one best suited for our fingerprint PAD approach.
TABLE 3
Summary of PAIs in the database. The total number of samples is
given as well as the number of PAI species sharing the same material
basis. Modifications include different colours and transparency levels or
applying conductive augmentations.
# Printout # Overlay
49 paper (1) 51 dental material (1)
64 transparent (1) 170 dragon skin (3)
# Full finger 1059 ecoflex (3)
72 3D printed (2) 301 gelatin (2)
33 dental material (1) 173 glue (4)
477 dragon skin (3) 34 latex (1)
291 ecoflex (4) 377 silicone (3)
147 latex (2) 692 silicone cond. (3)
116 playdoh (4) 72 urethane (1)
55 silly putty (3) 18 wax (1)
74 wax (1) 14 bandage plaster (1)
TABLE 4
Partition of training, validation, and test datasets.
Samples BF Samples PA Samples
Training set 5,717 5,717 0
Validation set 3,553 3,553 0
Test set 14,780 10,441 4,339
Total 24,050 19,711 4,339
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
5.1 Database and Experimental Protocol
The data was collected in four acquisition sessions in two
distinct locations within a timeframe of nine months. Sub-
jects could participate multiple times and presented six to
eight fingers per capture round including thumb, index,
middle, and ring fingers. Fingers were presented as they
were, which resulted in samples with different levels of
moisture, dirt, or ink. Further details about the capture
process are given in [46]. The combined database contains
a total of 24,050 samples comprising 19,711 bona fides
and additional 4,339 PAs stemming from 45 different PAI
species. These PAI species include full fake fingers and
more challenging overlays as summarised in Table 3. The
printouts were also worn as overlays and conductive paint
was applied to some PAIs. Note that the project sponsor
indicated to make the complete dataset available in the near
future for reproducibility and comparison.
The combined database is split into non-overlapping
training, validation, and test sets, where subjects who par-
ticipated multiple times are included in only one of the sets.
This ensures a fair evaluation on unseen samples at the
test stage. Randomly assigning 30% of the subjects to the
training and additional 20% to the validation set results in
the partitioning shown in Table 4.
Our implementation is done with Keras [57], which is
a python based deep learning library that facilitates the
definition, training and evaluation of various deep learning
model types. For training the parameters, we used the pre-
implemented RMSprop [58] as an adaptive optimiser.
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Fig. 4. DET curves for the three evaluated AE architectures on laser
(top) and SWIR (bottom) data.
The PAD performance is shown in detection error trade-
off (DET) curves between the BPCER and the APCER. For
further comparison the partial area under curve (pAUC) of
up to 20% error rate is computed for each curve. It should be
noted that the PAD threshold can be adjusted depending on
the use case: A low BPCER represents a very convenient
system, while a low APCER is more important for high
security applications. Furthermore, the detection equal error
rate (D-EER) is the point where APCER = BPCER.
5.2 PAD Method Evaluation
The first part of our experiments compares the three baseline
architectures: Conv-AE, Pooling-AE, and Dense-AE. The
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 40
APCER (in %)
0.1
0.2
0.5
1
2
5
10
20
40
BP
CE
R 
(in
 %
)
Laser Dense-AE-MSE; pAUC=29.01
Laser Dense-AE-wMSE (C=1.4); pAUC=82.65
Laser Dense-AE-wMSE (C=1.6); pAUC=41.10
Laser Dense-AE-wMSE (C=1.8); pAUC=28.82
Laser Dense-AE-wMSE (C=2.0); pAUC=22.45
Laser Dense-AE-wMSE (C=2.2); pAUC=24.37
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 40
APCER (in %)
0.1
0.2
0.5
1
2
5
10
20
40
BP
CE
R 
(in
 %
)
SWIR Dense-AE-MSE; pAUC=10.22
SWIR Dense-AE-wMSE (C=1.4); pAUC=7.86
SWIR Dense-AE-wMSE (C=1.6); pAUC=7.90
SWIR Dense-AE-wMSE (C=1.8); pAUC=7.30
SWIR Dense-AE-wMSE (C=2.0); pAUC=8.94
SWIR Dense-AE-wMSE (C=2.2); pAUC=7.95
Fig. 5. DET curves and pAUC (%) of the Dense-AE comparing the MSE
approach to the wMSE optimisation on laser (top) SWIR (bottom) data.
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Fig. 6. DET curves and pAUC (%) from different weighted score-level
fusions of the best-performing wMSE Dense-AEs.
corresponding DET curves for both laser (top) and SWIR
(bottom) input data are shown in Fig. 4. In both cases,
the Dense-AE (red) achieves the best performance at all
thresholds. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Dense-AE
is better capable of extracting relevant latent features of the
given input data, that can be reconstructed to the original
image.
In the next step, the MSE (Eq. 2) has been replaced
by our proposed wMSE (Eq. 6). Since the wMSE involves
another hyperparameter C , Fig. 5 depict the DET curves
for different parameter choices for laser and SWIR data,
respectively. Also, the best performing baseline model has
been added (Dense-AE with MSE) in order to directly com-
pare it with the new settings. Looking at the graphs and
the pAUC values, the performance increases for growing
values of C . This indicates that by choosing C too low, the
excluded image areas are too large, which in turn leads to
a loss of information. This phenomenon can be observed
up to values of C=2.2 (laser) and C=2.0 (SWIR), where
the performance decreases again. Choosing C values that
are too high leads to thresholds, that non of the pixel-wise
REs exceed. Therefore, too few areas are excluded from
the training process. Hence, in our experiments, values of
OC-SVM
OC-SVM
AE
OC-GMM
OC-GMM
SWIR
(1200, 1300, 1450, 1550 nm)
Laser
(first, middle, last)
4D/3D Image Tensors
AE Latent
Representation
VGG19 Features
AE Latent
Representation
VGG19 Features
Fig. 7. Overview of the additionally benchmarked one-class classifiers
and their corresponding input features.
C=2.0 (laser) and C=1.8 (SWIR) proved to be good choices.
To evaluate whether the laser and SWIR AE models
complement each other, we applied a weighted score fusion
and the resulting DETs are depicted in Fig. 6. The given
pAUCs show that the performance constantly decreases for
higher weights on the laser scores. Thus, the optimal setting
is to only use the SWIR scores as any inclusion of the laser
scores has a negative effect on the classification results. On
the other hand, for a possible high security application (e.g.,
APCER = 0.1%) the fusion benefits from the laser-based
PAD. However, the BPCER values are above our 20% pAUC
mark and thus not considered in computing the pAUC.
When analysing the occurring APCEs for a convenient
BPCER=0.2%, we found that all falsely classified PA samples
of the SWIR AE are also misclassified by the laser AE. This
includes mostly transparent overlays of clear dragon skin
and two part silicone or full finger PAIs in yellow and or-
ange playdoh. Also previous works [16], [28] on SWIR PAD
had troubles with orange playdoh since its reflections are
nearly identical to skin within the SWIR spectrum. The other
APCEs are still close enough to bona fide representations
that the reconstruction errors could not be distinguished.
In addition to the already mentioned APCEs, the laser AE
further fails to detect full finger PAIs of dragon skin, ecoflex,
and monster latex and overlays out of gelatin, school glue,
ecoflex, gelatin, and monster latex. Since the laser samples
are all captured in the same wavelength, PAIs are more
likely to resemble bona fide samples.
5.3 Benchmark with other One-class Classifiers
Summarising the results so far, the best performance could
be obtained with the Dense-AE trained on the SWIR dataset
using the proposed wMSE. To put these numbers into
context, we benchmark our proposed AE with further one-
class classifiers. In this context, we train and test a OC-
SVM [59] and a OC-GMM [60] on two different feature
representations of the input images. One is the latent feature
representation as a result of the encoding phase from our
Dense-AE and the other method utilises the VGG19 [61]
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Fig. 8. DET curves and pAUC (%) from the benchmark of SWIR wMSE
Dense-AE to other classifiers trained on latent AE representations.
CNN pre-trained on [29] to only extract features from the
given input. This results in a total of four combinations
of classifiers and features for each SWIR and laser data as
depicted in Fig. 7. Finally, the laser and SWIR approaches
are also fused to enhance their detection accuracy. Fig. 8 and
Fig. 9 visualise how the AE benchmarks against other one-
class classifiers. The first graph contains the performance of
OC-SVMs and OC-GMMs trained on the latent representa-
tions of the AE. The second graph shows the DET curves
of both classifiers trained on features extracted with a pre-
trained CNN (see Section 4). The AE performs significantly
better than both other approaches since its curves are well
below the other methods. Interestingly, the fused OC-GMM
performs second-best with a pAUC of 37.57% (latent) and
24.91% (VGG19). Contrary to the AE, the performances of
the OC-SVMs and OC-GMMs can be improved by fusing
the laser and SWIR scores. Thus, in contrast to the AE, there
is a complementary effect measurable.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a one-class PAD method
based on convolutional autoencoders. Specifically, we com-
pared three different AE architectures (Conv-AE, Pooling-
AE, and Dense-AE). Based on our experiments, we can
conclude that the Dense-AE performs significantly better
than the other model architectures on both laser and SWIR
input images.
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Fig. 9. DET curves and pAUC (%) from the benchmark of SWIR wMSE
Dense-AE to other classifiers trained on features extracted by VGG19.
Additionally, we proposed the wMSE as an extension of
the MSE with the idea of ignoring disturbing image areas
(e.g. illumination interference) during both training and
testing. With the MSE replaced by the wMSE, the pAUC
values could further be improved from 29.01% to 22.45%
(laser) and from 10.22% to 7.30% (SWIR). The weighted
fusion of the laser and SWIR scores did not improve the
results. Therefore, in contrast to related work applying two-
class approaches, the two AEs do not complement each
other.
Finally, two additional well-established one-class clas-
sifiers (OC-SVMs and OC-GMMs) have been trained on
two different feature inputs. The first set of OC-SVMs and
OC-GMMs were trained on the latent representations of
the best performing AE. The second features have been
extracted with a VGG19 [61] CNN pre-trained on [29]. None
of the alternative one-class classifiers achieved a comparable
performance to our proposed Dense-AE, which proves the
soundness of the approach. Nevertheless, both alternative
methods benefit from information fusion of laser and SWIR
data.
Future work will focus on further optimising the wMSE.
In our work, every pixel-wise RE gets an individual weight
(zero or one) depending on whether it exceeds the chosen
threshold C or not. This binary criterion could be loosened
to allow the weights to have values between zero and one.
Additionally, the concept of the Dense-AE can be applied to
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further PAD tasks as face and iris PAD, or software-based
fingerprint PAD on the LivDet datasets.
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